Abstract
This article will offer reforms in three areas. First, there must be a new wave of remedies tied to pretrial, trial, and post-trial proceedings. Second, there needs to be a systematic collection of data regarding snitch and cooperating witness testimony. Finally, this article will propose a collection of structural reforms within the prosecutorial system itself.

Abstract
In Part II, the article will address how life-sentenced capital defendants have lost double jeopardy protection. It will then suggest analyses designed to clarify which defendants can safely appeal and which cannot safely do so. Part III of the article will then examine at the death-sentenced defendant and the difficulties faced by the defendant at re-sentencing if his appeal is successful.

Abstract
This article will explain why a capital defender must seek the appointment of a mitigation specialist, and it will argue why Virginia courts should grant an appointment as a matter of right in all capital cases. Part II of this article will further explain the mitigation specialist’s role on a capital defense team, how this role differs from that performed by a mental health expert appointed pursuant to Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1 (“3:1 expert”), and why this role can neither be adequately nor sufficiently performed by any other potential member of the capital defense team. Part III of this article will detail the proper procedure for requesting a mitigation specialist. Finally, Part IV of this article will demonstrate why the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution require that a mitigation specialist be automatically granted upon the request of a capital defendant.

Abstract
This article proposes that brainwashing should be recognized as a defensive posture, similar to duress or BWS, in the unique case of capital murder. In Part II, this article discusses the origins of brainwashing and its development in the scientific community and legal system. Part III of this article examines the analytical similarities between brainwashing and the doctrinally acceptable defenses of duress and BWS. Part IV outlines the application of the defense in a capital case and the future of brainwashing.

Abstract
This article will first provide an explanation of why religious material should be excluded from the jury room in capital punishment deliberations. Second, this article will provide an overview of the common law rules in Virginia for determining whether a jury was influenced by extraneous material. Third, an outline of the traditional methods for limiting the possibility of religion-based verdicts will be offered. Emphasis will be placed on the procedural mechanisms of a jury trial as well as post-verdict direct attacks under the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury and the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, this article will explore the viability of challenging religion-based verdicts under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Abstract
This article discusses the effect of frontal lobe dysfunction on behavior and the most effective use of such evidence in a capital murder case. Part II will examine the scientific aspects of frontal lobe dysfunction including, the symptoms and the relationship between dysfunction and criminality. Part III will explain the ways in which frontal lobe damage may be used as a valid defensive posture in a capital murder case. In particular, this Part will examine the use of frontal lobe dysfunction evidence in a diminished capacity defense, in an insanity defense, and as mitigating evidence during sentencing proceedings. Finally, Part IV will discuss how defense counsel can effectively explain frontal lobe dysfunction to the jury without offending individual notions of free will and morality.

Abstract
Therefore, this article will examine some of the approaches other jurisdictions have taken with respect to these issues. It will also suggest which resolutions to these problems best protect a defendant’s constitutional rights, and it will predict which resolutions Virginia courts might adopt in practice. Part II of this Article will examine the United States Supreme Court’s decision that a defendant must have the benefit of counsel in deciding whether to submit to a psychiatric evaluation. Part III will explore the constitutional dimensions of allowing defense counsel to attend psychiatric evaluations. Part IV will discuss who, if anybody apart from defense counsel, may attend the examination. Part V will evaluate, from the defense perspective, the desirability of videotaping the examination. It will also examine the likelihood that a judge would grant a request for a videorecording from either party and some alternatives to a videorecording. Part VI will investigate which examinations, other than an examination to determine sanity, defense counsel or other members of the defense team may attend. Part VII will note when evidence from such examinations will be admissible. Finally, Part VIII will discuss what role defense counsel should play at the examination.